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Abstract: Some 20 years after unification, the contrast between East and West Germany 
provides a unique natural experiment for studying the persistence of communist-era 
family patterns, the effects of economic change, and the complexities of the process of 
fertility postponement. After unification, fertility rates plummeted in the former East 
Germany to record low levels. The number of births per year fell 60 percent. The period 
total fertility rate (TFR) reached a low of 0.8. Since the middle of the 1990s, however, 
period fertility rates have been rising in East Germany, in contrast to the nearly constant 
rates seen in the West. By 2008, the TFR of East Germany had overtaken that of the West. 
In this paper, we explore why fertility in the East is higher than in West Germany, despite 
the severe economic situation in the East, whether the East German TFR will increase 
even further in the future, and whether the West German rate will remain at the constantly 
low level that has prevailed since the 1970s. This article seeks to shed some light on these 
questions by (a) giving an account of the persisting East-West differences in attitudes 
towards and constraints on childbearing, (b) conducting an order-specific fertility analysis 
of recent fertility trends, and (c) projecting completed fertility for the recent East and 
West German cohorts. In addition to using the Human Fertility Database, we draw upon 
Perinatal Statistics, which enable us to conduct an order-specific fertility analysis. This 
new data source allows us to calculate a tempo-corrected TFR for East and West 
Germany, which has not been available previously.  
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Introduction 
The 20th century was a time of dramatic demographic changes. One of the most 
remarkable developments in the latter half of the century was the demographic response 
to the collapse of communism. In virtually all countries of the former Eastern Bloc, 
fertility declined with the demise of the communist systems to unprecedented low levels 
(Eberstadt 1994; Witte and Wagner 1995, Sobotka 2004; Frejka and Sobotka 2008; 
Billingsley 2010). However, nowhere was the fertility response so drastic and abrupt as in 
East Germany.
1 The fall of the Berlin Wall, which marks the end of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), left its immediate imprint in the monthly fertility rates, 
which declined almost exactly nine months thereafter. In 1992, the East German period 
fertility rates finally reached a record low level of 0.8 children per woman. This probably 
would have been the lowest TFR value that had ever been recorded for a country, if the 
GDR had still been in existence.  
With the unification of Germany in October 1990, the GDR ceased to be a 
country, and a radical and swift transformation of the East German society was initiated. 
The central question for many researchers at that time was whether, and under what 
conditions, the East German fertility rate would start to recover (Eberstadt 1994; Witte 
and Wagner 1996; Conrad et al. 1996). The optimists in the research community predicted 
                                                 
1   In this study, the term “West Germany” refers to the region that until 1990 belonged to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. “East Germany” refers to the region that until 1990 belonged to the German 
Democratic  Republic.  For  the  time  after  German  unification,  “western  Germany”  and  “eastern 
Germany” would probably be more appropriate terms for distinguishing the two parts of the country. 
For the sake of readability, however, we use the terms “West Germany” and “East Germany” for the 
periods both before and after 1990.  
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a swift convergence of behavior, arguing that institutional constraints in the two parts of 
Germany would converge as well. The pessimistic view pointed to the severe economic 
conditions in the East, which were not projected to improve substantially in the 
foreseeable future. If it is assumed that fertility rates respond to economic conditions, it 
may be expected that East German fertility would remain permanently below West 
German levels. 
In 2008 −exactly 18 years after unification− the period total fertility rates of East 
and West Germany had finally converged. In both parts of the country, the current TFR 
has reached 1.4. Arguably, the fertility rates of both societies have met at a very low level. 
However, the fact that East German period fertility has caught up with the West German 
rate still has important implications. It suggests that East Germany has overcome the 
“demographic shock” (Eberstadt 1994) that was diagnosed in the period after German 
unification. It also suggests that, in terms of fertility behavior, the “two Germanies” have 
finally reunited, signifying one step towards the social unification of the two formerly 
separated countries. 
 However, we can also approach this fertility development from another 
perspective: East German period fertility has been constantly rising in recent years, while 
the West German rate seems to have frozen at a level of 1.4 children since the 1970s. 
What might look like a convergence of behavior could actually be a cross-over; in the 
future, East Germany may leave West Germany behind. If we disregard Berlin −which 
population mainly belonged to West Germany before unification− we can even conclude 
that East Germany has already overtaken the West (Figure 1). Is it really plausible that 
women are having more children in the East than in the West despite the relatively poor 
economic conditions in the East? Will the total fertility rate in both parts of the country 
move in tandem in the future? Or can we expect that the East German TFR will increase   4 
even further in the future, while the West German rate will remain at a constantly low 
level, as it has since the 1970s?  
Given the complexity of the period TFR, these seemingly simple questions are 
rather difficult to answer. Ideally, the TFR is a measure for the total number of children a 
woman bears over her lifetime. Being a period measure, it is, however, seriously distorted 
by changes in the ages at which women have their children (Ni Bhrolchain 1992; 
Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). Additionally, it is an indicator that summarizes fertility 
across all birth orders. Both aspects − namely, differences in the timing of birth and 
differences in the order-specific behavior − are important for understanding fertility 
dynamics in contemporary societies. Prior studies have revealed that East and West 
Germans differ considerably in the ages at which they have their first child. In addition, 
differences in transition rates to second- and third-order births have been reported 
(Kreyenfeld 2003; Huinink 2005; Mayer and Schulze 2010). What might look like a 
convergence of behavior, based on the development of the TFR, might in fact be pure 
coincidence. Instead, the similarity of the TFR value might conceal divergent patterns of 
behavior.  
This article seeks to shed some light on recent fertility trends in East and West 
Germany. The East German case might be instructive for several reasons. First, it might 
help us to understand the fertility changes that have occurred across Eastern Europe in 
recent decades. The fertility response in East Germany was drastic and immediate, and 
reflects the speed at which the societal and economic transformation took place. As such, 
East Germany might provide an indication of what direction fertility in other Eastern 
European countries will take. For the purposes of our research, it is also a considerable 
advantage that East Germany can be directly compared to West Germany, which is 
subject to the same legal and political institutions. Therefore, it is much easier to make   5 
sense of the fertility development in East Germany than in other former communist 
countries. The East German case also challenges our ideas about the relationship between 
economic conditions and fertility. It seems like a paradox that East German period fertility 
has caught up with the West German rate, even though the economic situation is still 
much less favorable in the eastern part of the country. Furthermore, the greatest increase 
in the period fertility rate is observed for the late 1990s, a period in which the economic 
situation tended towards stagnation. The West German case is of interest because it is 
among the countries with the longest continuous history of low fertility in the world, and 
period fertility measures show no sign yet of increase, in contrast to recently rising 
fertility in the vast majority of low fertility populations (Goldstein et al. 2009). 
In this paper, we try to shed light on these issues by (a) giving an account of the 
factors that might explain persisting East-West differences in fertility dynamics, (b) 
conducting an order-specific fertility analysis of fertility trends, and (c) projecting 
completed fertility for the recent cohorts. We draw on two new data sources for these 
purposes. First, we use fertility data which has just been made available in the Human 
Fertility Database (2011). We also draw upon the Perinatal Statistics, which enable us to 
conduct an order-specific fertility analysis for Germany. In contrast to German vital 
statistics, which until recently did not distinguish children by biological order, the 
Perinatal Statistics provide a clear indication of the parity of the mother at each birth 
(Kreyenfeld et al. 2010b). This enables us to give a more detailed account of the order-
specific fertility behavior in the two parts of Germany. Furthermore, it enables us to 
generate a tempo-adjusted TFR, which has not been available for this country previously.  
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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Convergence in Constraints and Attitudes?  
When fertility rates declined in the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall, a lively 
debate ensued about the causes of the sudden drop in birth intensities. The collapse of the 
communist system seemed an ideal field experiment that would enable us to understand 
how individuals respond to radically changing economic and social constraints (Witte and 
Wagner 1996: 387). A dominant view at that time was that the decline in fertility was a 
sign of a societal “shock,” a “crisis,” or even an indication of societal “anomie” (Eberstadt 
1994; Adler 1997; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003). Meanwhile, other researchers reflected 
upon the new personal opportunities that opened up after unification. Individualization, 
self-actualization, and career advancement were assumed to be strong forces that led 
young East German women and men to postpone their fertility plans (Beck-Gernsheim 
1997). Disagreement arose, however, around the question of what the future would bring, 
particularly if East German fertility were to continue to remain below West German 
levels, and around the issue of whether East Germans would eventually “westernize” their 
behavior (Conrad et al. 1996: 332). Today, 20 years after unification, we can look back 
and must conclude that many of the assumptions and interpretations of the past have been 
proven wrong.  
The first mistake was regarding the speed of the transformation process. The 
Unification Treaty, which was ratified on October 3, 1990, had nullified the legal and 
political system of the German Democratic Republic, replacing it with the West German 
system. While this legal transformation was amazingly profound and swift, the 
transformation of the East German economy followed another path. The prior hope of a 
steady convergence of economic conditions had been abandoned by the end of the 1990s, 
when growth in wages and productivity showed indications of slowing in East Germany 
(Emmerich and Walwei 1998, Brenke and Zimmermann 2010). Up to today, East   7 
Germany grapples with high unemployment rates. Moreover, East German wages have 
never reached parity with the West, nor have East Germans acquired private property to 
an extent that even remotely approaches West German levels. Given these continuing 
gaps in earnings and wealth, it is unsurprising that distinct differences remain in how East 
and West Germans feel about their economic situation and the security of their jobs 
(Table 1). 
Researchers also failed to predict accurately how slowly the two societies would 
converge in terms of value structures, attitudes, and beliefs. At the time of unification, it 
was argued that, because the two regions shared a common cultural heritage, East and 
West German attitudes and values would swiftly converge. However, this assumption 
failed to adequately take into account how profound the exposure to 40 years of 
communism had been. The oppressive policies of the communist government had 
effectively erased religion and religious practice from everyday life. A very distinct 
legacy of this communist past is the fact that East Germany is today one of the most 
secularized areas in the world (Pollack 2002). In 1992, a large majority of the population 
(66 percent) in the East stated that they had no religious affiliation, compared to only 12 
percent in the West. Since then, the share of the population with a religious affiliation has 
declined even further in the East, partly due to the adoption of West German tax 
regulations, which include a “church tax.”
2  
Also in some other respects, the East German population remained distinct from 
                                                 
2   While  a  church  tax  also  existed  in  the  former  East  Germany,  the  collection  of  the  tax  was  not 
enforced. This changed after unification, when the West German tax system was introduced in the 
East and the tax offices were authorized to collect the church tax together with the other taxes. As a 
result, the economic costs of having a religious affiliation increased after 1990. This is believed to 
one  of  the  reasons  why  the  share  of  people  with  a  religious  affiliation  declined  further  after 
unification, despite the fact that the church now enjoyed greater freedom.    8 
the West German one. This applies to the education stratification of the population which 
is still more homogenous in the East than in the West due to a relatively low share of 
university graduates, on the one hand, and a small share of East Germans with a very low 
level of education on the other hand (Huinink et al. 1995). Differences in the social strata 
of the two societies can also be noted for the ethnic composition of the two parts of 
Germany. Related to the contrasting migration policies of the former GDR and FRG, the 
share of foreign born is still substantially lower in the eastern than in the western part of 
the country. This aspect is also relevant for understanding fertility in East and West 
Germany as foreign migrants to Germany have elevated fertility levels compared to the 
native population (Milewski 2010). 
Another striking difference between the two parts of the country is the divergence 
in opinions regarding maternal employment. West Germans are notoriously concerned 
about the adverse effects of maternal employment on the well-being of their children –the 
strong disapproval of so-called “Rabenmutter” (Raven Mother) who neglects her infant– 
while East Germans generally do not share this worry (Scott 1999; Treas and Widmer 
2000). The difference in attitudes towards maternal employment corresponds to a much 
higher share of mothers working full-time. In 2008, only 19 percent of West German 
mothers were employed full-time, compared with 50 percent of East German mothers 
(Table 1). The employment patterns of East and West German women differ in such 
fundamental ways that it is possible to wonder how such a divergent pattern can exist in 
one country. However, the availability of public day care also plays an important role in 
this context. Several researchers have asserted that unification was accompanied by a 
“sharp decline in the availability of childcare in the East” (Rindfuss and Brewster 1996: 
273), and by a privatization of day care centers (Adler 1997: 44). In fact, however, there 
was no sharp reduction in the availability of public child care in the East. Instead, East 
Germans are still privileged in the sense that work and family life are quite compatible in   9 
this part of the country, due to the wide availability of public day care places, including 
places for children below age three.  
Thus, the prior prediction that the societies would swiftly converge has not yet 
materialized. It is, however, important to note here that assumptions that East Germany 
needed to be “modernized” or “westernized” were oversimplified. While the East German 
economy has indeed lagged behind, the East German family model is many respects more 
“advanced” than the West German model. East German women mostly work full-time, 
they have access to a wide range of day care facilities, and their male partners are more 
likely to take on housework and child care tasks than their more traditional counterparts in 
the West (Trappe and Sørensen 2006). Thus, East German society has reached a level of 
gender equality that West Germany is still striving to achieve. 
The most significant error that researchers made, however, was related to the 
interpretation of demographic indicators. Some researchers had diagnosed a crisis-related 
East German fertility behavior from simply looking at the drop in the period total fertility 
rate. The convergence of East German TFR values towards West German levels at the end 
of the 1990s was consistently interpreted as a convergence of fertility behavior patterns in 
East and West Germany. Retrospectively, we must conclude that this perception was 
wrong. It arose out of an interpretation of basic demographic indicators that failed to take 
into account the differences in East and West German behavior prior to unification, which 
we now turn to in the next section. 
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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A Journey Back in Time: Fertility in the FRG and in the GDR  
Until the demise of the communist system, there were several marked differences in 
fertility behavior between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German 
Democratic Republic. First, the lifetime fertility of the East German cohorts was slightly 
higher than that of their West German counterparts. Second, differences existed in the 
timing of first parenthood. In East Germany, the mean age at first birth fluctuated around 
age 22, and the levels of lifelong childlessness never grew to more than five to ten 
percent. In West Germany, however, behavior changed profoundly starting with the 
cohorts born in the 1950s. Women postponed first-time motherhood, and childlessness 
increased steadily to about 20 percent for the more recent cohorts (Table 2). 
Despite the strong differences in first-birth patterns, the rates of progression to a 
second child were rather similar in the two parts of Germany. About 70 percent of the 
women who had a first child went on to have a second child (Table 2). A major 
characteristic of East German fertility was, however, a low progression rate to a third 
child. This pattern is surprising, given that the pro-natalistic policies of the GDR provided 
various incentives to have a larger family (Frerich and Frey 1993). A common 
explanation for the low third-birth intensities is the all-encompassing labor market 
integration of women in the GDR. The normal weekly work schedule was more than 40 
hours, and more flexible work arrangements (such as part-time work) that might have 
been more compatible with larger families were not available, and were not tolerated by 
the GDR government (Höhn and Schwarz 1993). In addition, the limited access to private 
housing has been cited as a possible reason for the unwillingness of East Germans to have 
a third child (Frerich and Frey 1993; Kreyenfeld 2008). 
 
[Table 2 about here]   11 
 
 
Fertility in the Wake of Unification 
In 1989, the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, two different “fertility regimes” existed in 
the two parts of Germany. The most important difference between the two systems is in 
the age at first-time parenthood. In 1989, West German women were roughly age 27 when 
they had their first child, while their East German counterparts were, at age 22, five years 
younger (Kreyenfeld 2002; 2003). Given these differences, a convergence of East and 
West German behavior would have meant that the age at parenthood in the East would 
have to increase dramatically. As a result, the annual fertility rates would have been 
suppressed temporarily by tempo effects.
3  
Unfortunately, the opportunities for conducting the order-specific fertility analysis 
that would have helped us to tease out these tempo distortions have been limited. With 
German unification, the legal framework of the GDR was replaced by West German 
regulations. This also applied to regulations that governed the collection of demographic 
data. While the GDR statistics recorded births by biological order, the statistics in the 
West did not take note of biological birth order. With the ratification of the Unification 
                                                 
3  In  addition,  massive  East-to-West  migration  flows  have  occurred  in  the  aftermath  of  unification.  In 
particular, young and highly educated women migrated, which has prompted researchers to speculate that 
the East “are loosing births to the West” (Mai and Scharein 2009: 87). Any “loss of births”, however, would 
not  have affected birth rates unless  movers and  stayers  differed radically in their  fertility. But even if 
movers and stayers differed (as it has been shown by Vatterrott (2011)), we would not find a large effect on 
fertility rates. For example, if 2 percent of the population migrated, and the fertility rate difference between 
migrants and non-migrants  was 20 percent, then this  would only change the regional rates by about 2 
percent of 20 percent, or 0.4 percent.    12 
Treaty, the East and West German statistics were harmonized. As a consequence, order-
specific birth information was no longer available for the East, and vital statistics did not 
provide answers to the questions of whether and how the age at first-time childbearing 
had increased in East Germany.
4 
While there are no order-specific fertility indicators available from vital statistics, 
there are several survey datasets that can be used to investigate fertility behavior. By 
piecing together the various survey-based results, it is possible to get a more or less 
coherent picture of the changes in birth behavior in East Germany after unification. Most 
importantly, these survey data indicate that East German women who were childless at 
unification postponed parenthood to the higher ages typical of West Germany. Yet despite 
the large increase in the age at first birth, East Germans remained younger when they had 
their first child than their counterparts in the West (Kreyenfeld 2003). The relatively high 
first-birth intensities of East Germans are, however, in sharp contrast to their second-birth 
behavior. It is clear from the analysis of survey data that second-birth rates have declined 
below West German levels in the course of unification (Sackmann 1999; Huinink 2005; 
Huinink and Kreyenfeld 2004; Kreyenfeld 2008; Arránz Becker et al. 2010). Particularly 
women who just had their first child before the fall of the Wall were strongly affected in 
their fertility behavior. Unification cut into the fertility careers of these women. On the 
one hand, these women were still very young at first childbearing, and they could have 
postponed having a second child to a later age. However, we can now conclude that many 
of these women have forgone having a second child altogether (Kreyenfeld 2008). 
Little is known about the behavior of subsequent cohorts. Qualitative studies tell 
                                                 
4   Since 2008, German vital statistics include order-specific birth information.  The data quality of the 
2008-data has, however, not been sufficient so that it has not been released. Order specific data have 
now become available for the year 2009.   13 
us that childless East Germans are more certain than West Germans that they want to have 
children over the course of their lives (Buhr et al. 2010). However, there are no studies 
that deal with recent trends in East and West German behavior. Furthermore, the sample 
sizes in the survey data are mostly small, and it is therefore not possible to estimate birth 
rates by single years. A tempo-corrected TFR, which has been generated for other Eastern 
European countries, is consequently not available for Germany. This also means that 
Germany has been missing consistently from cross-national studies that provide an 
overview of recent fertility trends (Sobotka 2004; Goldstein et al. 2009). The related 
question of how we should interpret the convergence of East and West German TFR 
values in 2008 remains unanswered. 
 
Birth Order-Specific Developments between 2001 and 2008 
In order to understand the recent convergence in East and West German fertility behavior, 
the following analysis draws on two types of data sources. First, we use Perinatal 
Statistics for the period 2001-2008 to provide us with insights into order-specific fertility 
behavior in East and West Germany. The Perinatal Statistics are part of the hospital 
statistics, and they include clinical records for all children who were delivered in German 
hospitals. They provide a clear indication of the parity of the mother at each birth. For the 
period 2001-2008, almost five million live births are available from these statistics. Based 
on these statistics, order-specific fertility rates have been made available (for details, see 
Kreyenfeld et al. 2010b). Second, we use cohort- and age-specific fertility rates for East 
and West Germany which have recently become available in the Human Fertility 
Database (2011).
5  
                                                 
5   Age- and cohort-specific fertility rates had been available for Germany previously. However, the 
data in the Human Fertility Data Base (2010) take into account the changes in the definition of age   14 
Figure 2 displays period TFR values by order based on the data from the Perinatal 
Statistics. If we recall the development of the period TFR (Figure 1), we can see that there 
is a convergence of East and West German values in 2008. Based on Figure 2, we can 
now conclude that the recent convergence is attributable in large part to a drastic increase 
in the TFR for second-order births in East Germany. While the second-order TFR in the 
East was only around 0.38 in 2001, it had increased to 0.45 by 2008, almost reaching 
West German levels. This suggests that East Germany has overcome the “second-birth 
crisis” that was diagnosed in the past. This is, however, not the case for third-birth rates. 
Despite some increases in recent years, there is still an East-West difference in third-birth 
behavior. If we also take into account that West German third-birth rates are quite low 
compared to other European countries, we must conclude that the low third-birth rates are 
still a major characteristic of the East German fertility regime. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
Table 3 provides the mean ages at childbirth by birth order for the period 2001-2008. This 
table illustrates two remarkable developments. First, the postponement of the first birth 
has not yet come to a halt. In both parts of Germany, the age at first birth has increased 
steadily by about one year in the period 2001-2008. This means that the period TFR is 
still distorted by tempo effects in both parts of Germany. Another remarkable trend that 
can be discerned from this table is related to the East-West-differences in the age at first-
time motherhood. At age 27.5 in 2008, East Germans are still more than one year younger 
                                                                                                                                                  
which have occurred in both parts of Germany over time. Furthermore, the HFD provides order-
specific  fertility  rates  for  East  Germany  in  a  computerized  format,  which  has  not  been  widely 
available before (Kreyenfeld et al. 2010a).    15 
when they have their first child than their West German counterparts. Regarding second-
order births, East-West differences are smaller than for first births, which suggests that 
East Germans probably space their first and second children farther apart than West 
Germans. It is notable, too, that the age at second birth has increased at a similar pace as 
the age at first birth for the period considered here, which suggests that the TFR for 
second-order births is also distorted by tempo changes. This does not, however, apply to 
the same extent to third- and higher-order births. The pace of postponement is broadly 
similar in the two parts of Germany, particularly for higher-order births, a phenomenon 
that is important to note when formulating tempo-adjusted fertility rates. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
Table 3 shows the tempo-adjusted TFR for East and West Germany. Here we used the 
standard adjustment suggested by Bongaarts and Feneey (1998), which is commonly 
referred to as the “BF adjustment.” As the adjusted TFR is known to be quite volatile 
(Sobotka and Lutz 2009, see also Table A1 in the Appendix), we have generated the 
averages for the periods 2001-2004 and 2005-2008. The adjusted TFR suggests that the 
fertility level in the two parts of Germany is, at about 1.6 children, roughly the same. This 
seems plausible as it matches the cohort fertility of the cohorts who have just completed 
childbearing. The parity-specific estimates also seem plausible. They indicate that 
childlessness in West Germany is around 20 percent, while it is still lower in the eastern 
parts of the country. 
However, some caution is warranted in the interpretation of the adjusted TFR. The 
BF adjustment relies on the assumption that the shape of the fertility schedule remains 
constant (Kohler and Philipov 2001; Goldstein et al. 2009). As can be seen from Figure   16 
A1 in the appendix, this assumption does not hold. Particularly interesting is the shape of 
the second-birth rates in East Germany. It seems that there is not just a shift in the age 
schedule, but that the birth rate at higher ages has increased, while it has remained 
constant at younger ages. This could suggest that the increase in the second-birth rates are 
not just tempo effects that are related to the behavior of women who had postponed the 
first birth, and who are only now having a second child (Lesthaegue and Willems 1999). 
In the next section, we will look at the development of the cohort TFR, which relies on 
different assumptions than those underlie the BF formula. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
The Future of Fertility in East and West Germany 
The results from the tempo-adjusted TFR for the period 2001-2008 suggest that East and 
West German fertility has converged at a level of 1.6 children per woman. This is about 
the cohort fertility rate of the West German 1963 cohort. The cohort fertility for the same 
East German cohort is, at 1.7, slightly higher. In addition, for the younger cohorts, who 
are still of childbearing age, we can see that East Germans have, up to today, more 
children on average than West Germans (Figure A2 in the appendix). However, the 
potential of the East German cohorts to “recuperate” at higher ages is probably lower than 
for the West German cohorts. If we take into account that East Germans have a lower rate 
of childbearing at higher ages, this could mean that East German cohort fertility will soon 
drop below the West German rate. We address this possibility in the following discussion. 
Figure 3 provides projections on the cohort fertility for the two parts of Germany. 
Our approach is to project cohort fertility based on recent age-specific trends. In contrast   17 
to the popular “frozen rate” method, our method incorporates our knowledge that fertility 
is being postponed, and uses linear extrapolation of age-specific rates.
6 We believe that 
the projections of cohorts observed until at least age 38 are highly reliable because they 
involve the projection of only a small fraction of the fertility of these cohorts. But the 
projection for cohorts truncated at earlier ages is more uncertain. We have indicated this 
in the figure by using dots to show the cohorts that are observed until at least age 43, solid 
lines to indicate the cohorts observed until at least age 38, and dashed lines for those 
observed until at least age 33.  
One conclusion that can be drawn from this figure is that there is a reversal in the 
long-term downward trend in cohort fertility in West Germany. The cohorts born around 
1970 seem to mark the turning point. For the subsequent cohorts, cohort fertility again 
increases. This trend reversal in cohort fertility corresponds to the first generations of 
young women who were able to take advantage of more generous family policies in West 
Germany, such as the expansion of public day for children below age three. This may be 
mere coincidence but is nonetheless suggestive. Second, the figure shows East German 
cohort fertility will temporarily drop below West German levels. For the East German 
cohorts born between 1965 and 1970, we observe a continuous decline in fertility. This 
might be explained by the unfavorable economic situation that these cohorts have been 
exposed to. However, it is also necessary to take a life-course perspective when 
interpreting East German cohort fertility rates. Many of the women of the cohorts born 
between 1965 and 1970 had just had their first child before unification. This means that 
                                                 
6   In order to project age-specific fertility trends, we used the last five years in the observed age-
specific fertility rates. For each age, we used linear interpolation to predict the birth rate at a given 
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unification basically “cut” into the fertility careers of these women. Unification occurred 
at a time when many of these women had just one child. Although they might have been 
quite young when they had their first children, they did not “pick up” their fertility careers 
at later ages, and often remained with one child only. This means that it is not only the 
economic situation that has kept these East German women from having any further 
children, but rather the combination of the economic situation and a reluctance to have 
unusually large birth intervals.  
For the East German cohorts who started their reproductive lives after unification 
(cohorts born 1971 and later), the situation is different. They had postponed first-time 
childbearing to later stages in their lives, and thus to the end of the 1990s or the beginning 
of this century, when the economic situation in the East had eased to a great extent. 
Compared to previous cohorts whose fertility careers had been “disrupted” by the 
economic and social upheavals that followed unification, these cohorts could opt for a 
second child without having to choose unusually high birth intervals. The increase in the 
second-order TFR fits this interpretation (Figure 2). The final increase in the East German 
cohort fertility would be in line with this assumption, too.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
We began this paper with the observation that period fertility in East Germany has 
overtaken that of the West. Superficially, this might appear to be evidence of a 
convergence of fertility behavior of East and West Germans nearly two decades after 
unification. However, we have argued that the similarity in current period fertility rates in 
the two parts of Germany hides fundamental differences in demographic behavioral   19 
patterns. What seems like a belated demographic unification of the two parts of Germany 
covers up major contrasts. 
The analyses presented in this paper have revealed the presence of marked 
differences in order-specific fertility patterns. Motherhood in East Germany still occurs at 
younger ages than motherhood in the West. On average, an East German woman is one 
year younger when she has her first child than a West German woman. Furthermore, 
having children is still a more universal experience in East Germany, as the shares of 
childlessness are lower in the East than in the West. Although the one-child family is still 
slightly more prevalent in the East than in the West, the big increases in recent period 
fertility are due to the convergence of second-birth rates. Third-birth rates in the East have 
remained below West German levels. What we are seeing 18 years after unification is, we 
interpret, the reemergence of higher period fertility in the East due to less childlessness 
and a “catch-up” in the progression to second births.  
The analysis of period fertility, even when it is broken down by parity, can lead to 
some confusion between the level of fertility and changes in timing (Bongaarts and 
Feeney 1998; Sobotka and Lutz 2009). Using newly available able data from the Human 
Fertility Database (2011), we were able to construct a new time series of cohort fertility. 
Our method of cohort projection, which is well-suited for conditions of fertility 
postponement, shows the following. First, as was already known, there has been a long 
history of higher cohort fertility in the East than in the West that began before unification. 
Second, there has been an important reversal in the decade-long trend toward lower 
cohort fertility in the West. Third, although much of the decline in period fertility in the 
1990s was due to postponement, the decline in cohort fertility in the East shows us that 
there was also a real reduction in lifetime childbearing. Fourth, cohort fertility in the East 
will most likely drop below West German levels for the cohorts born around 1970. These   20 
cohorts are expected to have lower cohort fertility than their East German predecessors, 
and also slightly lower fertility than their contemporaries born in the West. However, we 
expect that the decline in East German cohort fertility will be temporary. Indeed, if age 
specific trends continue unchanged –a big “if”– then East German cohorts born at the end 
of the 1970s would catch up with their West German counterparts.
7  
It is also important to note that in East Germany –as in other Eastern European 
countries– postponement of births was an easy option for women because of the early and 
universal childbearing that existed before the Wall came down. Women who were 
childless at unification were rather young, and they could postpone parenthood until the 
economic and societal situation had stabilized, without fearing that they would reach the 
biological limits of fertility. Direct exposure to their West German counterparts appears to 
have shifted the normative age limits of fertility in East Germany. While the age at first 
birth increased only gradually in many Eastern European countries (Sobotka 2004; 
Perelli-Harris 2006, 20008; Frejka and Sobotka 2008), East German women had the 
“normative freedom” to postpone their first birth towards higher West German ages.  
What East Germany has in common with other Eastern European countries is, 
however, the low second-birth rate during the period after unification (Frejka and Sobotka 
2008). We have argued that low second-birth intensities, particularly for the cohorts born 
between 1965 and 1970, could be attributable to the fact that some of these women had 
their first child before unification. The upheavals that followed unification cut into the 
fertility careers of these women. Although they were very young when they had their first 
child, they did not have a second child at later ages, as this would have meant unusually 
                                                 
7   In Figure 3, we purposely truncate the projections with the cohort 1975 because we believe that 
future forecasts are rather uncertain. However, if trends continue unchanged into the future the 
cohort fertility of the East would overtake that of the West.   21 
long birth intervals. Recent increases indicate that the decline in second-birth rates was a 
transitory effect of unification. 
The East German fertility development is also an example of how economic 
conditions need not be the determining factor in fertility levels. Despite worse, and fairly 
stagnant, economic opportunities, East Germans are still younger at first birth than women 
in the West, motherhood is more universal and period fertility is slightly higher. Although 
economic improvements may increase fertility even further in the East, the enormous 
economic differences between East and West do not produce –as, for example, Myrsklä et 
al. (2010) would suggest– higher period fertility in the West.  
The direct comparison of East with West Germany also points to the aspects of the 
former communist regimes that might have been conducive to high fertility. A high 
degree of family orientation fosters universal motherhood in the East. While the economic 
conditions might have adverse effects on East German fertility, women’s labor market 
behavior –buttressed by the wide availability of public day care– make the East German 
society more gender-equal than the West German society (McDonald 2000; Adserà 2004). 
The male breadwinner model, which remains prevalent in West Germany, is a precarious 
family arrangement when economic conditions deteriorate. Furthermore, the 
incompatibility of childrearing and employment in West Germany have pressured many 
women to choose between having children or pursuing a career –which has resulted in 
world-record levels of childlessness. Gradually, the West German society is changing as 
child care for children under age three is becoming more widely available, and as 
maternal employment is slowly becoming more acceptable. As these changes take hold, 
West Germany’s fertility rates may be expected to gradually move upwards. If economic 
conditions improve in the East, we expect continued increase in the East as well. In both 
parts of Germany, increases in period birth rates are likely at some point in the near   22 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Socioeconomic Indicators in East and West Germany  
  West Germany  East Germany 
  ~1990  ~2000  ~2008  ~1990  ~2000  ~2008 
Economic Indicators             
  Unemployment rate 
1)  6.2  8.4  7.8  10.2  18.5  14.5 
  Annual earnings of employees (in euros)
2)  26,698  32,438  35,229  15,185  26,387  29,257 
  % households with housing property
3)  40%  44%  44%  26%  32%  32% 
Economic Worries             
  % worried about finances 
4)  12%  13%  17%   30%  22%  26% 
  % worried about job security 
5)  12%  9%  10%  39%   20%  19% 
Religion in Society             
  % without religious affiliation
6)  12%  13%  16%  66%  71%  74% 
Child Care and Maternal Employment             
   % full-time employed mothers
7)  23%  20%  19%  74%  58%  50% 
   % of children ages 0-3 in day care
8)  2%  3%  12%  56%  37%  41% 
Notes: 1) The unemployment rate refers to the years 1991, 2000, and 2009. It was calculated based on 
dependent civilian workforce. Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2010)  
2) Values refer to the annual earnings of the employees (“Arbeitnehmerentgelte je Arbeitnehmer, Inland”) 
for the years 1991, 2000, and 2009. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2010a) 
3) Values refer to the years 1991, 2000, and 2008. Source: Frick and Grimm (2010: 657) 
4) Values refer to the years 1990, 2000, and 2008. The figure represents the share of respondents who are 
very worried about their financial situation. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, own estimations based 
on sample A and C. 
5) Values refer to the years 1990, 2000, and 2008. The figure represents the share of employed respondents 
who are very worried about the security of their jobs. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, own 
estimations based on sample A and C. 
6) Values refer to the years 1992, 2000, and 2008. Source: ALLBUS, own estimates 
7) Values refer to the years 1991, 2000, and 2008. Estimations based on the German micro-census provided 
by Esther Geisler. The sample includes mothers ages 18-45 who have at least one child who is age 18 or 
younger and lives in the same household as the respondent. West Berlin was grouped to West Germany. 
8) Values refer to the years 1990, 2002, and 2009. Values for the years 1990 and 2002 are “provision rates” 
(share of available day care places per 100 children). The values for the year 2009 are “usage rates” (share 
of children in day care per 100 children). Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1992, 2004, 2010b).    31 
Table 2: Number of Children of West and East German Women, by Birth Cohort 
  West Germany  East Germany 
  1950-54  1955-59  1960-64  1950-54  1955-59  1960-64 
Distribution (column %)             
  Childless  17%  19%  21%  9%  10%  12% 
  One child  25%  23%  22%  28%  27%  31% 
  Two children   38%  38%  38%  47%  47%  42% 
  Three children   14%  14%  13%  12%  12%  11% 
  Four and more children   6%  6%  5%  4%  5%  4% 
             
Parity Progression Ratios             
 PPR 0,1  0.83  0.81  0.79  0.91  0.90  0.88 
 PPR 1,2  0.70  0.72  0.72  0.69  0.70  0.65 
 PPR 2,3   0.34  0.34  0.32  0.25  0.27  0.26 
Note: Berlin is included in East Germany.  
Source: Estimates based on data from the 2008 micro-census provided by the German Federal Statistical 
Office (Statistisches Bundesamt)   32 
 
Table 3: Mean Age at Childbirth by Birth Order  
East Germany   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
1
st child   26.12  26.35  26.60  26.85  26.97  27.07  27.29  27.47 
2
nd child  29.32  29.54  29.66  29.86  29.94  30.10  30.45  30.67 
3
rd child   31.42  31.64  31.62  31.62  31.63  31.83  32.07  32.21 
4
th+ child  33.15  33.23  33.09  33.00  33.10  33.21  33.08  33.34 
All births  27.94  28.14  28.34  28.55  28.68  28.85  29.10  29.30 
West Germany   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
1
st child   27.43  27.57  27.74  27.95  28.10  28.26  28.49  28.69 
2
nd child  29.88  30.04  30.15  30.30  30.43  30.57  30.78  30.98 
3
rd child   31.46  31.57  31.65  31.79  31.87  31.96  32.19  32.35 
4
th+ child  33.06  33.09  33.19  33.26  33.32  33.41  33.49  33.56 
All births  28.99  29.14  29.28  29.46  29.60  29.76  29.97  30.15 
Note: Only ages 15-44 are considered. Berlin is included in East Germany  
Source: BQS Perinatal Statistics (own estimates), for details see Kreyenfeld et al. (2010b)   33 
 
Table 4: Tempo-Adjusted TFR (Ages 15-44) 
 East Germany  2001-2004  2005-2008  2001-2008 
1
st child  
 
0.88  0.82  0.84 
2
nd child  0.48  0.57  0.52 
3
rd child   0.12  0.16  0.13 
4
th+ child  0.05  0.07  0.06 
Total  1.54  1.66  1.55 
West Germany  2001-2004  2005-2008  2001-2008 
1
st child   0.82  0.82  0.81 
2
nd child  0.55  0.58  0.56 
3
rd child   0.17  0.19  0.18 
4
th+ child  0.07  0.08  0.07 
Total  1.62  1.66  1.63 
Note: Only ages 15-44 are considered. Berlin is included in East Germany. The adjusted TFR for each 
period was calculated by using the average TFR for a given period and changes in the age at birth during 
this time period. The change in the age at childbirth was calculated by taking into account the age at the 
beginning and at the end of the period (see Table A1 in the appendix). Source: Own estimates based on 
BQS Perinatal Statistics  34 
Table A1: Tempo-Adjusted TFR  
East Germany  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
1
st child   0.87  0.89  0.84  0.75  0.79  0.87 
2
nd child  0.47  0.47  0.48  0.47  0.56  0.62 
3
rd child   0.12  0.11  0.12  0.13  0.16  0.16 
4
th+ child  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.07 
Total  1.51  1.52  1.50  1.42  1.58  1.72 
West Germany  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
1
st child   0.80  0.82  0.82  0.78  0.80  0.85 
2
nd child  0.55  0.55  0.56  0.55  0.57  0.59 
3
rd child   0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.19  0.20 
4
th+ child  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.08 
Total  1.59  1.62  1.63  1.57  1.63  1.72 
Note: Only ages 15-44 are considered. Bongaarts-Feeney Adjustment was applied (see Bongaarts and 
Feeney 1998). 
Source: Own estimates based on BQS Perinatal Statistics   35 
Figures 
 












Note: Until 1990, West Germany also includes West Berlin and East Germany includes East Berlin. After 
1990, West Germany does not include any part of Berlin. For East Germany, we display separate graphs 
with and without Berlin. Due to a regional reform (which came into force in the beginning of 2001), it is not 
possible to differentiate Berlin along the old territorial borders of East and West Germany any longer.  
Source: HFD (2011) 
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Source: BQS Perinatal Statistics (own estimates), for details see Kreyenfeld et al. (2010b)   37 















Fertility observed at least until                ...age 43            ...age 38               ...age 33  
 
Note: Cohort TFR estimated by linearly extrapolating the age-specific rate from the last five cohorts. 
Observed fertility available until 2009 from HFD. Age is defined as age reached at the beginning of the 
year. 
Data source: Human Fertility Database – Germany (2011) 
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Figure A1: Age-Specific Fertility Rates by Birth Order for East and West Germany 














































Source: BQS-Perinatal Statistics (own estimations) 
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Figure A2: Cohort Fertility Rates in East and West Germany in 2009 



















Source: HFD (2011) 
 
 
 